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The following paper examines the relevance of both Reasons Basicness and The Second-Personal 
Standpoint as potential explanations as to the nature of accountability. I begin by recognizing 
the importance of blame as an ethical experience, and start a project that aims to uncover the 
normative implications of blame. Ultimately I regard that, due to an inextricable link to 
obligation, normative notions of blame are grounded in morally normative pressures. In doing 
so, I deny the thesis of Reasons Basicness, and ask the reader to adopt a position sympathetic 
to the concepts of mutual accountability in Stephen Darwall’s Second-Personal Standpoint.   
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1.  Introduction  
1.1  Background & Thesis  
I first began thinking of the following project when I asked a friend of mine what I thought at 
the time was a fairly innocuous question: at what point in our everyday life do we act on 
these normative pressures that are so frequently mentioned in the literature of ethical 
philosophy? I readily accept that there appears to be various forms of normativity, but what 
normative considerations are actually at play when we use ethics in our everyday lives? An 
answer to this query is what I call the accountability thesis. It is as follows: (AT) If ethical 
propositions are considerations of determining what one ought or ought not to do, then it 
seems fair that an awareness to such considerations is exercised in those moments when an 
agent or group of agents holds another accountable for their actions. Accepting AT as the 
actualization of ethical principles, the following project will develop an argument that 
focuses on the relationship that these principles have to normativity and moral obligation. I 
will contend that an agent is solely motivated by the normative pressure of moral obligations 
when she blames another. Further, I will argue that what is really needed to capture this 
sense of obligation necessary for AT is a particular kind of normative structure constituted 
within the moral community. So, by virtue of being intrinsically associated with blame, the 
normative pressure of moral obligation is qualitatively distinct from other possible examples 
of normativity.  
 
                                                        
1 A special thanks to Imran Thobani for exciting the conversation that led to me thinking about this problem for months on end. 
2 It is here where I acknowledge that I reside on the Unceded Coast Salish Territories of the xwməәθkwəәy̓əәm (Musqueam), 
Sə̓әlílwəәtaʔ/Selilwitulh (Tsleil-Waututh) and Skwxwú7mesh Úxwumixw (Squamish) Peoples. In every facet of my life, whether 
academic or otherwise, I- a first generation Canadian of European ancestry- am a guest on these lands. 
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In order to flesh out my above thesis, I will provide some background into the 
Hypotheticalism and reason basicness of Mark Schroeder. This concept will illuminate some 
key points regarding the role reasons play in determining the normative status of an object. 
However, I will eventually move to critique Schroeder’s view that reasons alone provide 
normativity to an action, and showcase how normative accounts lacking an explicit 
connection to morality cannot success- fully account for AT. I will move to discuss a 
profitable way to understand obligation and accountability. For the most part, I rely on 
Stephen Darwall’s account of moral obligation and accountability conveyed through his 
seminal work The Second Personal Standpoint. I agree with Darwall that moral obligations are 
essentially connected to his conception of second-personal account ability.3 Ultimately I will 
push back against the idea that reasons provide a suitable account of the normative features 
that function when an agent blames another. I posit that non-moral nor- mative pressures 
fail to capture obligation, and hence fail to provide an adequate account of blame. To begin, 
however, I will make some clarifying remarks regarding mutual accountability and the moral 
community.  
 
1.2  A Very Brief Insight Into Blame and The Moral Community 
It is important to demarcate between two dimensions of blame: the blameable and 
the blameworthy.4 The former concerns the reaction to a causal explanation. That is, it is just 
the reaction when an object is regarded by an agent as systematically responsible for 
something else happening. Lionel Kenner recognizes that in such cases “...all that we are 
doing is identifying the cause of some untoward event...”.5 A fine example of this is when we 
blame the weather or the stars for causing our misfortune. Blameworthiness, on the other 
hand, insinuates that the object being blamed has not only caused the event, but that it also 
had within its power the capability to avoid doing so. Intuitively there seems to be something 
different happening when I consider an object to be blameworthy rather than blameable. 
For example, it is absurd to think that I would blame the rain for getting me wet in the same 
way as I would you if you sprayed me with a hose. In the case of you and the hose, my 
response appears to based on your objectionable and perhaps malicious behaviour.6 It 
seems fair to say that I cannot object to the rain in the same way. While I will avoid an 
exhaustive discussion regarding these kinds of cases7, I think it is pertinent to pick up on the 
sentiment that agents blame other agents with an expectation that they can recognize, 
under- stand and react to being held accountable for their wrongdoing. For Kenner, this 
characteristic has to do with an agent’s free-will and rational disposition.8 I will return to this 
notion that agents, by virtue of being rational, are able to hold one another accountable 
                                                        
3 Stephen Darwall, The Second Personal Standpointm(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006) p. 99. 
4 I reference these terms merely as a means to facilitate a distinction. Other writers may use these titles in a more technical and 
poignant manner. 
5 Lionel Kenner, “On Blaming”  (Mind LXXXVI, 1967), p. 239. 
6 Ibid., 239-240. 
7 For further illumination on this very vibrant and interesting topic, see the Kenner (1967) already referenced and the object of that 
work’s critique, J.J. Smart’s Free-will, Praise and Blame (1961). 
8 Ibid., 239 
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when I begin an explication of Darwall’s theory of second-personal reasons and its 
conceptual link to moral obligation. I mention it here, however, as a means to illustrate how 
built into this idea of mutual accountability is a notion of a moral community. There does 
appear to be something normatively different between a rational agent’s standing to the rain 
and their standing to other rational agents. Perhaps, we owe things to beings or objects that 
fall short of mutual accountability, but given that my focus here is blame in a 
blameworthiness sense, my only concern is with those members of the moral community 
that respectively share this quality. Before I return to this notion of accountability, however, I 
will begin a discussion in the next section regarding Schroeder’s reason basicness.  
 
2.  Reasons & Normativity  
In much of the contemporary literature surrounding metaethics, the concept of 
reasons has dominated discussions of normativity. As T.M. Scanlon notes in Being Realistic 
About Reasons, “...a significant part of the debate [in metaethics] concerns...reasons for belief 
and other attitudes, which are increasingly recognized as normative...”.9 In the opening of his 
book, Schroeder recognizes this transition “...largely because it is seen to potentially 
have...vast implications on morality...”.10 In Schroeder’s project, it has turned the discussion 
away from whether or not morality is objectively prescriptive, and refocused it on an 
examination of how an agent’s reasons align with her psychological states (her desires). It 
seems uncontroversial to say that there are rea- sons that an agent may cite when acting in 
a particular way. Yet, it is still up for question whether or not this provides us with enough 
substance to account for a normative “ought” existing within such reasons. The following 
section will explore this philosophical picture by focusing on the neo- Humean perspective 
that Schroeder endorses.  
 
2.1  The Humean Theory of Reasons & Hypotheticalism  
The following is the scenario that serves as the backbone case-example for 
Schroeder:  
 
Ronnie and Bradley, like everyone else, have been invited to the party. But while 
Ronnie loves to dance, Bradley can’t stand it. Not only does he not like dancing, he 
prefers to stay away from where it is going on [...]. So while the fact that there will be 
dancing at the party is a reason for Ronnie to go, it is not a reason for Bradley to go.11  
 
What this example initially provides is an insight into the subjective nature of reasons 
between agents. That is, while the object is the same (that there is to be dancing at the 
party), Ronnie’s and Bradley’s reasons contrast with one another. Schroeder posits how 
                                                        
9 T.M. Scanlon, Being Realistic About Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 1. 
10 Mark Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 9. 
11 Ibid. 
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“...this is something to do with their respective psychologies”.12 In the Humean sense that he 
purports, Schroeder notes how reasons function in a way that is desire based— stemming 
from particular psychological states exclusive to that agent. This could be based on 
someone’s desires as it is professed in Hume’s original work, but Schroeder asks that this 
term be used sparingly, and regarded instead as a “...stipulative abbreviation for ‘the kind of 
psychological state...that ultimately explains the difference between Ronnie and Bradley”.13,14  
Still, his position falls under the umbrella of the Humean Theory of Reasons (HTR). While 
Schroeder alludes to the variability that this philosophical belief can carry, I will skip the 
distinctions he makes in his book, and instead move to explicate the version that he adopts, 
Hypotheticalism.  
 
Schroeder’s revamped version of HTR posits that the psychological states motivating 
an agent to have a particular reason are contingent imperatives in themselves.15 Now, what 
is important when distinguishing Hypotheticalism is what Schroeder says regarding objective 
normative reasons. In considering again the case of Ronnie and Bradley, Schroeder notes 
the following: “... if we suppose that neither Ronnie nor Bradley is aware that there will be 
dancing at the party tonight, the fact that there will be dancing there still counts...as a reason 
for Ronnie but not for Bradley to go...”.16 For Schroeder such a reason is normative in that 
there is a particular element of the reason (that is, the fact that there will be dancing at the 
party) which can be distinguished from the desires of Ronnie and Bradley respectively. Such 
a normative sense is what allows us to recognize the difference between Ronnie and 
Bradley.17 Now, this does not mean the normativity exists outside of the agent’s psychology, 
but that there is a sense in which external facts-of-the- matter contribute to the normative 
pressures internal to the agent. Thus there is a kind of third-personal relation between the 
reason(s) and agent(s). So, while the normative reasons, in order to be objective normative 
reasons, depend on the inner desires of the agent18 they still “... depend on how things are 
independently of the agent’s belief...”.19 This point goes further with Schroeder’s distinction 
regarding the triadic nature of the objective normative reason relation. 20  This is the 
consideration-place (Ronnie’s fondness to dance), the agent-place (Ronnie), and the action 
(attending the party). Hypotheticalism recognizes the external conditions that allow for 
normative reason to make some intuitive sense. That is, that there is a party happening 
where dancing is going down. With this in mind, it makes sense to regard Ronnie’s fondness 
to busting a move as a reason for him to go to the party.  
 
                                                        
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 9. 
14 This being said, Schroeder does eventually concede in Chapter 8 that best version of reasons will turn out to be a desire-dependance 
view that regards desire in the traditional sense of the term. However, my explication focuses mainly on Chapters 1 and 4, which 
doesn’t need to make such a hard-lined distinction. 
15 Ibid., 5. 
16 Ibid., 11-12. 
17 Ibid., 11. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 13. 
20 Ibid., 19. 
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2.2  Reason basicness and its relation to the normative  
The normative project for Schroeder, then, becomes a reductive one. For it is 
Ronnie’s desire that explains his reason “...because having such a desire is part of what it is 
for Ronnie to have a reason...”.21 Schroeder regards that it is exactly because normativity is 
best explained through reasons that this project becomes reductive.22 It is the idea that 
“...commitments of normative dis- course are primarily set out at least in part terms of other 
normative notions”.23 So, what then is a normative notion? To answer this, Schroeder 
employs a distinction made by Jean Hampton “... ‘that there are moral norms that are 
‘objectively authoritative’ in the sense that they give us normatively necessary reasons for 
various human activities’”. 24  Now, because reasons themselves are for Schroeder a 
normative category25, the reduction then takes on a normative to normative distinction. 
What is avoided then is any perplexity following from a non-normative to normative 
reduction.26 I will attempt, however, to showcase an example from Schroeder as to how the 
normative reduces to normative. Now, in order for a claim to be regarded as normatively 
relevant it must point to certain facts that are sure to be relevant to a normative 
consequence, but, from outside of the scenario involving any normative content, appears to 
paradigmatically non-normative in nature.27 Schroeder uses the example of there being a 
really good reason not to pull the trigger of gun when it’s pointed at your head. Now, facts 
regarding the gun or death, which clearly relate to normative consequences, are only 
relevant- and not contentful- in that they are not directly about the reasons themselves.  
 
Consider the two following sentences: (i) “pulling the trigger will result in your death”, 
and (ii) “it is better not to pull the trigger”. Now, (i) focuses on the reasons as a 
consequence— the relevant normative facts that surround the reason. Conversely, (ii) 
directly involves the reason it- self— the reason being of course that the pulling of the trigger 
will result in one’s death. Now, moving towards his thesis of reason basicness, Schroeder 
notes that while normative claims can be regarded as being about the reason or already 
involving reasons, it is still likely that the “... normative properties and relations have to be 
partly analyzed in terms or reasons...”.28 So, the thesis is as follows: (RB): What it is to be 
normative, is to be analyzed in terms of reasons.29 Then conclusively: “[t]he normative is all 
about reasons”.30 What RB allows for is a characterization of the normative that avoids an 
attempt to analyze it in terms of some kind of basic property such as good, right, or just.31 
Such moral concepts, have been a serious point of contention between philosophers. Yet, 
                                                        
21 Ibid.,21. 
22 Ibid., 79. 
23 Ibid., 78. 
24 Ibid., 80. 
25 Ibid. 
26 The problem with this is fleshed out in part 4.3 and 4.4. However, my paper does not have the scope to capture these distinctions. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 80-81. 
29 Ibid, 81. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
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Schroeder’s project can account for any of these basic properties because such properties 
are structurally related to “...some basic normative property like that of being a reason”.32    
 
While this account does not purport that a reductive project will also result in 
garnering the real moral facts, it does provide an explanation of how normative claims can 
be grounded in an analysis of reasons.33 Further, it also offers a third-personal account in 
that a reason can exist for Ronnie to go to the party regardless of whether or not he is aware 
that the party is taking place. Given the prospect that the normative is best explained by 
reasons alone34, Hypothetical- ism is then a project which can adequately tract questions 
surrounding various normative claims and relations.  
 
3.  The Second-Personal Standpoint & Moral Obligation 
The previous section highlighted an account aimed at the reduction of normative 
properties into the analysis of an agent’s reasons— sharing a close connection with that 
agent’s psychological states (or desires). Schroeder’s project does provide some interesting 
insights. For one, it pushes the discourse in a way where the motivating features of 
normativity are to be cashed out in terms of the reasons as to why an agent would be 
moved to do so. I think this is intuitive. Surely if X is normative then there will be 
recognizable reasons for an agent to X. Further, his project alluded to the concept of there 
being objective normative reasons for action. I showed how for Schroeder this relates to 
particular external facts relevant to a normative consequence, and how his account avoids 
slipping into establishing certain objective standards such as Goodness or Justice. 
  
Yet, this still might not be enough for an account of moral obligation that can work in 
the way I expect it to in order to satisfy AT. While Schroeder’s reductive project is insightful, it 
seems too locked to an agent’s individual psychological state for a robust account of 
accountability to be made. While a reason can exist outside of an agent’s awareness, for a 
normative pressure to be felt it appears as though the acting agent would need to 
experience the reason too. What is missing, I would, argue is a sense of obligation that can 
apply some kind of normative pressure onto such reasons. What I need is a position that can 
account for something I considered earlier, that there is a moral community in which 
rational agents are able to hold each other accountable to one another. HTR may have 
moments that allude to this35, but I doubt it goes far enough to sufficiently recognize AT. I 
will now move to discuss Darwall in hopes of gaining a sense of implicit agent-based 
obligations that still aligns with the intuitive appeal of reasons.  
 
 
 
                                                        
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 82-83. 
34 Ibid., 79. 
35 What Schroeder borrows from Hampton. 
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3.1  Second-personal Stance & Second-personal Reasons 
 Much of the discussion surrounding the focus on moral obligation in chapters four 
and five of The Second-Personal Standpoint show Darwall citing the concept of an implicit 
second-personal standing referenced at the book’s beginning. In coming to understand his 
account of moral obligation, it is necessary to touch base with what Darwall means by the 
second-person stance and second-personal reasons. After all, and as Michael Smith and Jada 
Twedt Strabbing note regarding Darwall’s position, “[w]e are morally obliged to act in a 
certain way only if we have sufficient second-personal reasons for so acting”.36  
 
For Darwall, there are particular presuppositions built into second-personal 
addresses.37 One is as follows: “...you and I must presuppose that we share a common 
second-personal authority, competence, and responsibility simply as free and rational 
agents”.38  Here Darwall is appealing to what I have already cited as a fairly intuitive 
sentiment regarding normative relation- ships between autonomous agents. That is, that 
there exists a moral community that rational agents are members of. Perhaps other non-
rational beings or objects can have membership too, but it is in the corporation of rational 
agents where we see instances of second-personal authority and mutual accountability 
emerge. Darwall refers to this relationship as the second-person stance.39 Basically, the 
second-person stance serves as a practical invocation of a moral community as it pertains to 
those kinds of agents who share in the reciprocal relationship of second-personal authority. 
Such agents are then able to recognize and facilitate certain kinds of reasons by proxy of 
being in this relationship (or standpoint) with one another.    
 
Darwall’s move to illustrate his account of second-personal reasons begins with a 
demarcation between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons. He notes how the latter can 
be regarded as “objective” and the former as “subjective”.40,41 To help facilitate his point, 
Darwall asks us to imagine a scenario in which an agent has caused you distress by placing 
their foot on top of yours. Now, an agent-neutral reason for Darwall is epistemic in that it 
serves as “...a reason for [an agent] to do something...”.42 Basically, it is an attempt to make 
the agent stepping on your foot aware of the pain they are causing, and subsequently 
recognize that removing their foot is the most appropriate action to take. So, the goal is to 
make the agent aware of some information or knowledge relative to the situation. Now, it is 
important to note that for Darwall “...second-personal reasons are always fundamentally 
agent-relative, [and that] the second-person stance...is the perspective one assumes in 
addressing practical thought...”.43 He contends that agent-relative reasons are practical in 
                                                        
36 Michael Smith & Jada Twedt Strabbing, “Moral Obligation, Accountability, and Second-Personal Reasons” (Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, LXXXI, 2010), p. 237. 
37 Darwall, Second Personal, 5. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 6. 
41 See footnote 9 in SPS (2006). 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., 9. 
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that they make very distinct and direct claims upon the agent.44 This would amount to you 
making a demand that the agent remove their foot. Darwall notes that while the reasons for 
wanting the agent to remove their foot may vary, what is important is that the agent is being 
addressed in a particular way. That is, via a demand.45 In doing so the addresser implies a 
kind of authority that we as agents have when making claims or demands on other agents. 
This is different from the agent-neutral case in that there is no expectation for the agent to 
come to know why you’re in pain. Rather, your address is meant to immediately instigate the 
agent to act in a particular way. So, a second-personal (or agent-relative) reason follows from 
a demand “...that asserts or implies [an agent’s] authority to claim or demand...”.46 This 
insinuates that there are certain demands one agent can make to another relative of the 
nature of the standing of one agent to another. What is being shown here is that there is a 
conceptual link between the second- personal stance, and the second-personal reasons that 
agents may make to one another. Further, the nature of such reasons, by virtue of being 
expressed within the second-person stance, are evoked as demands or claims between 
agents.  
 
3.2 Reactive Attitudes and Their Relation to Second-personal Authority  
Up to now I have given some much needed background surrounding Darwall’s 
conception of the moral community, and how we as rational agents appear operate within it. 
However, what is still needed is a sufficient explanation of how exactly obligation and the 
normative pressures that surround obligation are to be regarded. In the introduction to his 
book Morality, Authority, & Law, Darwall notes how moral concepts such as rightness, 
wrongness and moral obligation have a second-personal structure.47 So, built into the notion 
of the second-person stance previously highlighted, is an explicit account of obligation that is 
second-personal by nature. In order to understand the implicit second-personal relationship 
of moral obligation, I must first explicate the notion of reactive attitudes that Darwall 
highlights in Chapter 4 of The Second Personal Standpoint. This concept has substantial 
implications on notions of blame and wrongdoing. After all, Darwall recognizes how “[w]hat 
is wrong is what we can be morally expected not to do, what the moral community assumes 
the authority over us”.48 And further, that “...an agent is aptly blamed or the object of some 
other form of accountability-seeking reactive attitude if she lacks an adequate excuse”.49 So, 
the sentiment here is that a reactive attitude is vital for the second-personal operation of 
blame and accountability.    
 
Borrowing from P.F. Strawson, Darwall argues that “...the right kind of reasons for 
war- ranting the relevant attitude in its own terms must derive from distinctive norms for 
                                                        
44 Ibid., 7. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Stephen Darwall, Morality, Authority, & Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), xi. 
48 Darwall, Second Personal, 93. 
49 Ibid., 93. 
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attitudes of that kind...”.50 What is meant by this is that in order for something to count as a 
warranted attitude (a legitimate reaction perhaps) it must be connected to reasons of the 
right kind.51 Therefore the relevant reactive attitude is toward something relevant to the 
reasons surrounding the object involved. Reactive attitudes work as responses to “... 
‘transactions’ between individuals...”52, and can be distinguished into two classes: Participant 
reactive attitudes, and Impersonal reactive attitudes. The former distinction is an attitude felt 
from a personal (or “transagent”) perspective. While the latter is described as being felt 
“...from the standpoint of the moral community...”.53 Darwall uses the reactive attitudes of 
resentment and indignation to show this difference— resentment following from an 
individual attitude while indignation from the standpoint of the moral community at large. 
Or, in the very least, other members of the moral community. It may be that not all 
members are either aware of the object that such attitudes reference, or care in the same 
way to excite an impersonal reactive attitude. 
  
It appears that both classes of reactive attitudes can function simultaneously. 
Turning back to the example involving the foot, one can recognize how resentment and 
indignation can both be applied second-personally by both the agent who’s foot is being 
stepped on, as well the moral community as a whole. Interestingly, while the reactive 
attitudes differ categorically they both excite a similar normative focus. That is, they both 
have the potential to make the same kind of claim against the foot-stepping agent: “Get off 
my (their) foot!”. Now, Darwall also specifies how “...reasons that can warrant these 
attitudes—that can be reasons of the right kind—must be second-personal reasons”.54 This 
follows from the idea that these reactive attitudes condition- ally include “...a sense of 
authoritative demand...”.55 To summarize, Darwall conceives that re- active attitudes will 
invariably involve the following56:  
 
(a)  a form of (second-personal) address   
(b)  which presupposes an other’s competence and standing to be thus addressed 
(second-personal competence and authority) and  
(c) which responds to the person’s conduct  
(d) with respect to persons (at least)  
 
3.3  Second-personal Authority and Obligation  
From this convention of second-personal authority and the stance that captivates it 
we arrive at Darwall’s conception of obligation. Now, for Darwall, moral obligations are 
intrinsically tied to second-personal reasons, and therefore are subject to reactive attitudes 
                                                        
50 Ibid., 66. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., 67. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 68. 
56 Ibid., 70. 
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from other agents.57 He puts forward a conceptual connection between accountability and 
moral obligation. This conception of obligation and its inextricable link to accountability is as 
follows:  
We hesitate to impute wrongdoing unless we take ourselves to be in the range of the 
culpable, that is, unless the action is such that the agent is aptly blamed or the object of 
some other form of accountability-seeking reactive attitude if she lacks an adequate 
excuse.58  
 
So, if an agent has a second-personal reason for doing an action, others agents who 
are incorporated within the second-person stance with the first agent then have an authority 
to make claims on them. So, for Darwall, moral obligation “...is conceptually related to 
standards of minimally decent conduct that moral agents are accountable for complying 
with”.59 Further, reactive attitudes presuppose that there are reasons for agents to be 
obligated and potentially held account- able for their actions within the moral community. It 
is through second-personal forms of accountability that a sense of moral obligation arises. 
For it is in the nature of the moral community (in that it is second-personal) to have reasons 
to demand or make claims regarding particular normative conventions that are standard for 
the moral community and that define the nature of the second-person standing between 
agents.  
 
Borrowing a sentiment from Bernard Williams, Darwall notes how “...holding 
someone accountable for wrongdoing through blame unavoidably carries the implication 
that she had conclusive reason not to do what she is blamed for doing...”.60 He recognizes 
(and I would have to agree with him) that this statement is a fairly intuitive one. Just imagine, 
for example, blaming and agent for doing an action while simultaneously recognizing that 
she had rational reasons for doing it. 61  This would be silly. So, second-personal 
accountability is where we see moral obligation emerge. It is visible due to the sentiments 
that surround the interactions between agents with mutual accountability, the claims they 
make on one another, and the reactive attitudes expressed and regarded throughout their 
interactions. After all “...[t]here can be no such thing as moral obligation and wrongdoing 
without the normative standing to demand and hold agents account- able for compliance”.62 
Hence there is an inextricable link between moral obligation and the second-personal 
standing between agents. Moral obligations must have at their foundation sufficient 
reasons, and sufficient reasons- as I have already discussed- are intrinsically second-
personal. Regarding the conceptual link between second-personal reasons and moral 
obligation mentioned above: “Second-personal reasons secure the connection with 
                                                        
57 Ibid., 91-92. 
58 Ibid., 93. 
59 Ibid., 94. 
60 Ibid., 98. 
61 Of course, a blamer may be wrong as to whether or not the blamed agent is actually wrong. The point here is describe- in a sense- 
the psychology of the blamer. 
62 Ibid., 99. 
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accountability because, when some- one has such a reason, others are guaranteed to have 
the authority to make demands of him”.63 The existence of a moral obligation describes the 
mutual standing of reasons between agents— signifying corresponding second-personal 
reasons.  
 
4. Moving Towards A Positive Account  
When thinking about the normative pressures of blame, I find that only moral 
considerations can possibly be present when an agent blames another. Further, I have also 
aimed to push back on the idea that reasons alone can sufficiently explain the structural 
relationship between normativity and blame. The following section will further these 
notions.  
 
4.1 Blame and Moral Considerations 
  It is generally uncontroversial to claim that etiquette is a social system that carries 
with it normative pressure. We likely recognize and react to such pressures on a daily (or 
nightly) basis. Etiquette is often present at the dinner table; consider the following example:  
 
Imagine a dinner party taking place in a society much like our own. In this society, or 
perhaps even in just a particular station of this society, there is a code of etiquette (X) that 
requires a particular spoon be used in a particular hand at a particular point in time during 
the meal. X is very well known to all the guests who have been invited to the party. Now, 
Ursula- the daughter of the host64- has been brought up knowing and practicing X, and is 
present at the dinner. However, despite her knowledge of X, Ursula forgets to switch spoon-
hands at the correct time, and after the dinner party Ursula is blamed for her actions. That 
is, Ursula becomes held accountable to the normative standard of etiquette that she failed 
to carry out.  
 
When Ursula is blamed for failing to do X, her mother is exhibiting a particular 
reactive attitude (possibly disdain) towards her. Now, in order to be qualified as reasonable 
kind of attitude it must “... derive from distinctive norms for attitudes of that kind...”.65 That 
is, the reactive attitude must be connected to the norm of etiquette that has been usurped. 
For, such attitudes as Darwall notes “...are distinctively involved in holding people 
responsible”.66 Yet, Ursula’s mother doesn’t appear to be blaming her solely on the grounds 
of etiquette alone. Rather, her blame follows from a belief that there is something wrong 
with breaking the normative standards of etiquette. She has reasons to describe her reactive 
attitudes towards Ursula’s failure of X, but in holding her accountable for such failure she is 
holding her up to a standard of moral obligation that is conceptually connected to the 
                                                        
63 Smith et al., “Moral Obligations”, 240. 
64 Note, too, that Ursula is of the age and rational competence where she is participates in second-person- al accountability. After all, 
and as Darwall notes on the bottom of p. 95 (2006) some humans may be ex- ceptions to mutual accountability. 
65 Darwall, Second Personal, 66. 
66 Ibid. 
  
54 
demands that she (and her society) has made in enforcing X. Hence, there are second-
personal reasons for Ursula not to break X. As I have come to argue, the mere fact that X is 
in some sense blameworthy indicates its inextricable link to morality.  
 
4.2 The Normative Structure of Blame  
Now, I have two concerns with Schroeder’s account when approaching something 
like the example in 4.1. Firstly, I disagree with the idea that reasons alone are a relevant 
normative category in instances of blame. A reason to blame is not what instigates the 
pressure to blame Ursula. Rather, what instigates this pressure- that is, what makes it a valid 
claim to make- is the structure of norms that X is related to. Here I do not necessarily mean 
the structure of social norms, but rather the second-personal relationships between agents 
of a relevant second-personal standing that perpetuates such norms and makes the 
breaking of such norms an ethical violation. In being merely concepts counting in favour of 
something, reasons do little to explain the pressures behind normativity. What moves an 
agent to action, I argue, is the obligation present in instances of mutual accountability.  
 
I think Darwall is right in regarding such relationships of accountability as stemming 
from a second-person stance; and, further, I would contend that such a conception of the 
moral community allows for the focus of normativity to fall on the obligations themselves 
rather than reasons. After all AT stresses this conceptual link between obligation and the 
moral community in that the action of blaming in a blameworthy sense insinuates a kind of 
mutual accountability. Reasons alone do not stress this differentiating factor. For example, 
the reasons to blame the rain and the person with the hose appear to be the same- they 
both get you wet. Of course, one may note how the reasons are actually different because 
the rain and the person are qualitatively distinct and as such the reasons for blame would be 
too. I would have to agree. However, the reasons behind blaming the agent with hose are 
intrinsically second-personal, and as such their normativity is best described by appealing to 
the second-personal relationships from which they stem.  
 
So my second complaint is that Schroeder’s position doesn’t provide a robust enough 
ac- count of a moral community. That is, one that has a conceptual link to instances of AT. I 
think AT insinuates the potential for there to be a kind of moral community. However, I do 
not think it thereby necessitates a strict moral standard from which there can arise distinct 
moral facts regarding what one ought or ought not to do. Rather, this conception of a moral 
community provides a structure in which normative reasons can be applied between agents 
insofar as it allows us to make normative claims and demands upon one another.67 Much of 
this I have borrowed from Darwall’s account of second-personal standing, which carries with 
it a robust and useful sense of obligation. I contend that the position he sets down in 
                                                        
67 Further, it acknowledges the intuitive belief that we as rational agents share in similar phenomenological experiences- such as 
normativity. 
  
55 
regarding second-personal accountability can allow for a variety of relevant reasons that 
serve to excite the same claim and therefore the same expected action.68  
 
5.   Concluding Remarks  
We care about blaming people. Not in a malicious or maniacal kind of way, but in a 
way that cements our awareness of the moral community, and that second-person stance 
that we have to those applicable agents. Being that this project focused on blame as it 
pertains between agents of mutual accountability, I must note that I do not take this to mean 
that obligations are not owed to beings outside of this relationship. The moral community I 
think can harness objects that may not share in a second-person stance with us, but given 
that my focus here is on blame as it pertains to AT, I’ve left such considerations aside. So, we 
care about having ethical standards, and we care about the descriptive community of agents 
that can actively hold one another accountable. And if not in a philosophical way, we 
certainly care about the active implications this phenomenological experience of normativity 
has upon us. Our awareness of AT is reassuring in that it grants us license to hold other 
likeminded agents accountable. This, I would argue, is a beautiful freedom.  
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